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EVOLUTION, THEOLOGY, AND METHOD, PART 2:
SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND EVOLUTION1
FERNANDO
CANALE
Andrews University
Is the epistemological certainty of evolutionary theory so absolute that
Christian theologians should feel rationally compelled to accept its conclusions
even if they explicitly contradict the teachings of biblical revelation on the
origm of life on our planet? To answer this question we need to turn our
attention to the scientific method employed in the formation of evolutionary
theory. Specifically,we need to become aware of the concrete form in which
the empiricalmethod described in the previous article is shaped when scientists
use it to explain the origins of life on earth.
In the frrst article of this series, our brief epistemological analysis of the
scientific method in the empirical sciences reveals at least two main
characteristics of scientific knowledge. First, scientific methodology is able to
produce only hypothetical results. In other words, by applying scientific
methodology scientists arrive at tentative, conjectural, hypothetical
explanations-never at fmal absolute truth. Second, scientific hypotheses can
only reach a limited and relative certainty-never absolute truth. Scientific
knowledge is always relative to the presupposed theories from related fields and
the macro-hermeneutical metaphysical presuppositions scientists assume to
interpret their data and construct their explanations. We need to ask whether
the evolutionary theory results from the application of the scientific method
described above and, therefore, inherits its characteristics and limitations or
whether it results from the application of a different sort of scientific
methodology.
The fact is, however, that "not all sciences are created equal."' Differences
between sciences are determined by the object of study they attempt to clarify
(teleological condition). Due to the object it attempts to explain and the data
from which it draws its conclusion, evolutionism works with a method that is
substantially different from the method of the empirical sciences described
above. In ths article, then, I will begin by describing the difference between
empirical and evolutionary methodologes. Then I will consider the conditions
and procedures under and through which the method operates. Finally, I will
reflect on the corroboration and epistemologicalstatus of evolutionary theory.
'Fernando Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part I: Outline and Limits of Scientific
Methodology," AUSS 41 (2003): 65-100 is the first of a series of three articles.
2David L. Hull, "The Particular-Circumstance Model of Scientific Explanation," in Hidory
and Ewfution, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1992), 70.

Historical N a t m
"What we are doing when teaching Darwin's biotic hstory to out biology
students is pure hi~tory,"~
writes M. H. Nitecki. This is so because evolution in
general focuses "on the interpretation of individual historical events--events
destined never to be repeated as time marches on."4 There is a distinction
between nonhistorical sciences such as physics and chemistry, which focus on
the immutable laws of nature, and historical sciences such as geology,
paleontology, and evolutionary biology, which attempt to reconstruct the
physical and biological history of our planet. Epistemologists of evolutionary
science are aware of this distinction and the problems it poses to the scientific
status of evoluti~n.~
The scientific status of evolution becomes problematic because the myth
of science and the more modest description of the scientific method described
above have been modeled after the likeness of nodustorical disciplines such as
physics and hemi is try.^ For this reason, evolutionists recognize that "the study
of history is a discipline seemingly in search of, so far, very elusive theories or
law."' They are forced to answer Popper's view that history is not a science
because it is not interested in &ding universal laws but in knowing concrete
realities,8 and h s conviction that Darwinism is m e t a ~ h ~ s i cRobert
s . ~ J. Richards
recognizes that "evolutionary biology still does not meet the logical criteria that
Popper proposed for science. That is because it is historical and suffers from
The
the presumed disabilities of all history attempting to pass as s~ience."'~
question about the scientific status of the historical sciences, vis-i-vis the
nonhistorical ones, such as the social sciences, arises."
Not surprisingly, evolutionists strongly defend the scientific status of

'Matthew H. Nitecki, "History: La Grande Illusion," in Hi~toryandEuohtion, ed. Matthew H .
Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 5.
'Niles Eldredge, The Pattern gEvohtion (New York: Freeman, 1999), 8.
5 F ~ardiscussion of the way evolutionists attempt to solve the challenges presented by the
historical nature of their investigation, see Marc Ereshefsky, "The Historical Nature of
Evolutionary Theory," in Idistory and Ewhtwn, ed. Matthew H . Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 81-99.
6Robert J. Richards, "The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology," in
Histoy and Ewlulion, ed. Matthew H . Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New
York Press, l992), 19.
'Nitecki, 5.
'David B. Kitts, "The Conditions for a Nomothetic Paleontology," in History and Evohtion,
ed. Matthew H . Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992),
131-145.

"Nitecki, 8.
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historical disciplines;" note that physical data are not ah~storical;'~ar~ue
that
historical explanations are the most fundamental explanations we find in
science;14 draw parallels between science in the history of human events and
science in the hstory of geologcal and biological events; and discard criticisms
that historical sciences are "anecdotal," while the phenomena of physics are
"the keys" that unlock the universe.15 The general conviction, then, is that
history is or should be scientific.16Rachel Laudan observes that in both biology
and hstory "hstorical explanations are similar and either none is, or both are,
equally 'good science,' and the methodologies of general hstory and
evolutionary biology are homologous."17
These affirmations of the scientificstatus of historical science,however, miss
the main difference that exists between historical sciences such as geology and
paleontology, and empirical sciences such as physics and chemistry. The
difference appears when one compares the teleological condition in empiricaland
historical sciences, i.e., what each attempts to explain. Succinctly put, empirical
u
t
u
r
erealities, while historical sciences explain absent
sciences explain present andf
and past realities. Moreover, empirical sciences attempt to discover general
t
while historical sciences attempt to reconstruct,
patterns in yh'cal r e ~ m nevents,
interpret, and discover general patterns in hear unique events.
Empirical sciences explain the present by searching for sameness, and by
finding repetitive patterns in nature they can predict the future. Their celebrated
successes depend on the cyclical-repetitive nature of the subject matter they
study (the teleological condition they embrace). The description of the
empirical scientific method we studred in the first article of this series is tailored
to research repetitive cyclical reahties in nature.18
Historical sciences attempt to reconstruct the past-not explain general
recurrent patterns. This difference in the teleologcal condition of method
determines that historical sciences reach a lower level of reliability and
corroboration than physical sciences studyrng repetitive cycles of nature. Thus,
lk'Marc Ereshefsky argues that the distinction between evolutionary biology and such
nonhistorical sciences as physics and chemistry are [idnot clear, and that in both evolutionary
biology and experimental sciences there is a temporal ordering of events, the use of how-possibility
explanations, the uniqueness of events, and the reliance on particular-circumstance explanations"
(ibid., 7).
'"Yet it does not follow that the data of physics are ahistorical. It is obvious that all
phenomena, however brief, have a temporal component and that it is the behavior of entities of
the material universe over stretches of time-be they nanoseconds or billions of years-that
provides the human mind with an opportunity to grapple with the furniture of the universe"
(Eldredge, 12, emphasis original)

16RachelLaudan, 'What's so special about the past?," in History and Evolution, ed. Matthew
H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 57.
"Nitecki, 6.

physicists reconstructingthe first seconds in the history of our universe face the
same problems and limitations that evolutionists do in reconstructing the
hstory of life. What results in both cases are explanatory theories inferred from
present knowledge. But, by projecting inferences from the present to the
unavailable past, scientific method can attain only probable results-falling far
short of the relative certainty of present cyclical events.
The scientific reconstruction of the past results from combined
contributions of several scientific disciplines, notably, physics, geology,
paleontology, and biology. Of these four, the method in paleontological sm&s
replicates more closely methodologies used in the reconstruction and
interpretation of human events.l9The rllfference between human hstory and
biologcal hstory is the types of documents available and the different character
of the causes: "genetics, interaction of species,geological changes, and so
Finally, because evolution is a hstorical science,its method and outcome take
the form of narrative. T h ~ smeans that "all explanations of events in time are
ultimately narrative in str~cture."~'
Narratives explain by ordering "events along
a temporal dunension, so that prior events are understood to have given rise to
subsequent events and thereby to explain them-that, in brief, is what narratives
do."" Evolution, thus, is properly a cosmogonic metanarrative explaining the
origin and history of life's development on planet Earth. Let us turn our attention
now to the conditions operating in the scientific method applied to the study of
the physical, geological, and biological history of our world.

Teleological Condition
Evolutionary theory aims to understand and explain the historical process
through which the present came into existence. Evolutionists attempt to
understand past events that explain the present. The heart of hstorical
explanation is to follow the order of causes behind present realities, thereby
allowinghumans to understand the world and themselves. We must distingush,
then, between events and their interpretations.When paleontologists speak of
"facts" they mean that a past event actually took place.23By speahng about past
events as "facts" many evolutionists "may be implymg, or at least be forgetting
to avoid assuming, that the events of the past not only actually occurred, but
that they are the irreducible raw material with whch all hgher inferential
operations in hstory begin."24To assume that past events caused present
events is an acceptable general assumption. After all, since Aristotle we
'"tts,

133.

"Nitecki, 6.
"Richards, 23.
"Ibid.
Z3Kitts,132.
241bid.
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recognize that we know by identiffing "certain causes and principles."z5
Because evolutionists start by accepting evolution as metanarrative, they run the
risk of confusing the narrated events with the data from which those events are
inferred. Yet, as IGtts reminds us, "hstorical events, however familtar they may
become, and however routine the inferences that support them may seem to
be, lie not at the beginning of our quest for synthesis and historical
understanding, but somewhere along the way."26
To avoid this confusion, evolutionists should distinguish between their
object of study (teleological conchtion) and the data they study (material
condtion). Though past events properly play the role of teleological condition of
method, they cannot offer data from whch to study them simply because they are
not avadable to the scientists for observation and experiment. Past events, then,
are not the data, but rather are questions facing evolutionist theory.
The nonavailability of evolutionary events is ddferent from the
nonavailability, for instance, of the atom. The unavadabdity of the latter is due
to the size of apment reality, while the unavailabihty of the former is due to the
totalabsence of the object, event, or causes the evolutionary theory attempts to
explain. Thus, evolutionary theory is forced to explain by producing a
metanarrative that creates past events through "scientifically controlled"
inferences and irnagmation.This method of metaphysical constructionis similar
to the one followed when pre-Socratic philosophers constructed their
cosmogonies. They also used "controlled speculation" from what was then
"frrm" scientific knowledge to them. We have made progress in the amount
and precision of what we today consider "fm" scientific knowledge of the
world but stdl face the same methodological chfficulty confronted by the early
Greek philosophers: the events that caused our present world no longer exist.
The data of paleontology are the fossils, not the historical events they once
were. Fossils are not historical events, but historical artifacts-the remains of
life. In order to explain fossils' existence, paleontologists must frrst "irnagme"
events as possible causes of the fossil record. In the process, they "create"
events of whch we have no hstorical evidence. Macroevolutionary events
belong to this category. Fossils, as the remains of life, testify to their past
existence but say little about history, i.e., about the causal sequence that
origmated the existence of such remains. There is also a distinction between the
existence and the nature of the remains. Fossils testify to the existence of living
organisms but apparently say little about the cause of their existence or about
the nature of the indrvidual to which each fossil testifies. Reconstruction of life
is very chfficult because of its complexity. Science is good at learning by
isolating factors. It is difficult to see how science would be able to know by
considering all factors at the same time, especially when one has no possible
way to know all the ecological conditions that could have been present billions
of years ago.

Material Condition
What sources of data do scientists have to work with to produce the
evolutionist metanarrative? Basically they have two sources, the present
patterns of life studied by biologsts,2' and the remains of death studied by
paleontology. But biological data do not reveal duectly the macroevolutionary
patterns required by evolutionary theory; and paleontological data, being
controversial, spark disagreement among evolutionists about how to
of evolution.28Thus, evolutionists warn
reconstruct the past and tell the ccstory'y
us not to confuse specific models of evolution with its reality.29
"It is not the case that biologists discovered evolution in observable facts,
and then proceeded to explain it."30 Biologists have discovered only
rnicroevolutionarypatterns that fall far short of the macroevolutionaryprogress
essential to evolutionary theory. Thus, biological studies help only partially to
reconstruct an already assumed evolutionary history by providing a basis from
which to draw indirect inferences. By themselves, biological data do not testify
to macroevolution. It is only when evolutionary macro-hermeneutical
presuppositionsare applied that biological data become the launching pad from
which inferences can be projected to the past to reconstruct and flesh out
evolutionary history in some detail.
The "fact" of the evolutionary narrative is established by paleontological
studies. What data do paleontologists examine that tell them that life as we know
it today came into existence through an unbelievably lengthy process of
evolution? The fossil record is the silent witness from past life, which we
encounter in our present. As a messenger from the past, the fossil record calls for
rational explanation. Evolutionists claim evolution is the rational explanation for
the origin of life and is, then, a better explanation of the fossil record.
However, the fossil record is not "raw data," unambiguously pointing to
evolution. "The fact that evolutionary paleontologists and biblical creationists
invoke it with equal facihty is testimony to the ambiguities surrounding the very
notion of a fossil record."31Of course, for evolutionists such as David B. Kitts
nc'My training in evolutionary theory, as for many organismal biologists of my generation,
came from reading the works of the victors in the Evolutionary Synthesis, and through their
students and followers. We learned that among the achievements of the Synthesis was the
reconciliation between the genetical theory of evolutionary processes and rhe inferences of
evolutionary history that emerge from the work of paleontologists, comparative morphologists, and
systematists. That is, microevolutionary processes, suitably extrapolated through time, were
sufficient to account for macroevoiutionary histories of change. There have always been those who
did not accept this conclusion, however, and in recent years the tension between students of
evolutionary history and of evolutionary processes has become considerably more palpable"
(Douglas J. Futuyma, "History and Evolutionary Process," in History andEwhtion, ed. Matthew H.
Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki [Albany: State University of New York Press, 19921, 103).

"Ibid., 140.
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these "ambiguities" are minor and do not preclude evolution--only its fine
tuning. Their disagreements are not about whether evolution took place, but
about how to better reconstruct the process through which it took place. What
makes the difference between the creationist and evolutionist readings of the
fossil record? Why are evolutionists so certain that evolution took place? The
different interpretation of the fossil record produced by creationists and
evolutionists is determined by the different sets of presuppositions used to
interpret the data and deal with the data's ambiguities. This brings us to the
core of evolutionary methodology, namely, the a priori hermeneutical
conditions that make evolutionary theory possible.

H e m e n e h a l Conditions
Since evolutionarytheory came into existence by the combined interdisciplinary
connections of geology, paleontology, and biology, we need to briefly consider
their relation and the hermeneutical conditions wnder which they operate. My
goal in this section is only to indicate some of the most influential conditions
that make evolutionary theory possible. At the same time, the reader should
bear in mind that if these conditions are challenged or defined in different
ways, evolutionary theory must give way to an alternative explanation.
By interpreting the crust of our planet and the fossil record, geology and
paleontology have established a long chronological sequence for the history of
life. Accepting this historical time table, biological evolution explains how life
came into existence and developed into its present form by way of a
metanarrative. In so doing,
geologists and paleontologists escape almost entirely the suspicion of any
intent to distort history. When they rewrite history, as they do from time to
time, it is not likely to be seen as the result of a change of opinion, but rather
of an advance in knowledge. Scientists, by and large, regard themselves and
are regarded by others as people who settle the issues which divide them by
an appeal to facts.32

Yet, before geologists and paleontologists "begin their search for the past,"
they already "are committed to the view that whatever events they may propose
as antecedents in explanations of the present, these events will be those that do
not violate certain deeply held and widely shared theoretical notions.""That
evolutionary methodology stands on a priori and hermeneutical conditions
cannot be denied.34To understand the process through which evolution is
conceived and formulated, we need to consider at least some of the "theoretical
notions" on which it stakds.
In what follows, I will deal with some of the a priori presuppositions

""Both evolutionary biology and history are equally subjective activities because both are
influenced by the training and social standing o f their respective practitioners; yet both claim to
reach beyond their immediate circumstances" (Nitecki, 4-5).

operative in the construction of the evolutionary theory. By "a priori" I mean
a theory that has been formulated previously and independently from
evolutionary theory and that stands without scientific testing (what Popper calls
"metaphysical standing" because such theories have no physical corroboration).
The macro-hermeneuticalpresuppositions under which theologans operate are
basically the same ones assumed by scientists. We can summarize them in two
main kinds, presuppositions about reality (the object to be studied) and
presuppositionsabout the subject developing scientific theories (reason). Since
I am leading with scientific methodology as used in the construction of
evolutionary theory in this article, I will concentrate on ontologcal
presuppositions. I will begin with the ontological macro-hermeneutical
presuppositions at the basis of all the sciences and will continue with the mesohermeneutical presuppositions that derive from the various dsciplines involved
in the formulation of evolutionary theory.
Ontological Macro-hermeneutical Presuppositions:
A Priori Index of Reality: The Limits of
Scientific Imagination
Science studes reality. The frrst and broader assumptions that science originates
from are about the nature and general extension of the reality that scientists
research. Scientists assume two primary interrelated ontological notions. First,
they assume reality to be spatiotemporal. This presupposition may appear
obvious to scientists today, but in reality it represents a huge paradigmatic
change from the classical notion of timeless science that started with Greek
philosophy. The notion that reality is spatiotemporal left God out of
phlosophical and scientific knowledge because philosophers and theologians
had defined God's reality as timeless science. A science that studies what is
temporal and spatial cannot accommodate the study of a timeless God. When
evolutionists search for the biological hstory of the past, they leave God out
because they do not find God in space and time today. However, neither do
they fmd the events of evolution they so confidently consider "factual." The
reason why God is left out is more than h s objective absence from our present
spatiotemporalcausal order. It involves also the conviction that God could not
have intervened within the spatiotemporal continuum at any time in the past.
This conviction is grounded in the metaphysical assumption that God is
timeless and therefore cannot act w i t h the spatiotemporal continuum.
Because of their commitment to the biblical view of God, Adventists do not
assume the timeless view of God and therefore cannot dsplace God's historical
causality as described in Scripture out of the realm of scientific research. Here
Seventh-day Adventist theology radically departs from the presuppositions of
science and most Christian theologies.
Because God is left behind by scientific methodology, evolutionists
beginning with Darwin are forced to solve not only issues such as the
geographcal distributions of species, or the geologic column, but the
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metaphysical question about the origin of life itself, an issue that falls far
beyond the reach of science. One assumption in science is that nothing comes
out of nothing. In its present state, scientists have a hard time accepting this
assumption about origins. Either the world is eternal or it had a beginning.35If
it had a beginrung, then the God hypothesis disturbs the otherwise tranqd
waters of scientific assumptions. If it did not have a beginning, the question of
origin,which the big-bang theory and evolution attempt to answer, is irrelevant.
Evolutionary scientists recognize the existence and operation of macroherrneneutical o n t o l o g d presuppositions only indirectly. For instance, Kitts
says that "the study of history can be a rational enterprise only if some
restriction is placed upon what we ma_ysuppose to have occurred. In what may
be considered the mainstream of hstorical studies we are not, as James Hutton
put it (1795:547), '. . . to make nature act in violation of that order which we
actually observe."'36 Speaking about the credibility of hstorical evolutionary
narratives, Robert J. Richards tells us that they must adjust to the "index of
reality," whch, among other things, includes the "grain of the reader's f m
knowledge."37 As we will see below, the reader's "firm knowledge" is
determined from the present by the scientific community. The notion that
&vine causation in history is real falls outside the "index of reality" from which
scientists have chosen to bulld their cosmogony. Leaving God outside
science's horizon results from the acceptance of a naturalistic philosophical
ontology without scientific corroboration. This assumption leaves out divine
interventionsin creation and the flood. This is a methodologicaldecision which
not only stands on philosophical rather than scientific grounds, but may
actually guide scientists astray in the case that reality is not reduced to
naturalistic causes, as they dogmatically assume. We now turn our attention to
the micro-hermeneutical (disciplinary) presuppositions operating in
evolutionary theory.
Geology Assumes Physics
Geology is the paradigm science responsible for drawing the broad outhe of
Thus, the
earth history on which paleontology and evolutionary theory
hermeneutical presuppositions guiding geological theories also become
presuppositions of evolutionary theory.Among some of the micro-hermeneutical
presuppositionsleadmggeologicalresearch are the theories of physics, the science
"This is a limit of human reason we cannot overcome that Kant already recognized as the
fourth antinomy of pure reason (see his Critique o f P m Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn [Buffalo,
NY: Prometheus, 19901,257-258 [third conflict of transcendental ideas]).

3s"Geologyis the paradigm historical science. Its goal has been the discovery of events and
relationships among events that, being beyond the range of observation, can only be reached in
historical inferences, albeit inferences subject to the prior external constraint of physical theory"
(ICtts, 138).

that studies the most general aspects of natural reality. Kitts explicitly recognizes
the hermeneutical role of physical theory in evolution in the following way:
Physical theory does not serve as a set of axioms by which aIl geological
knowledge must be validated. It serves rather as a source of guiding principles
for historical research, and a limitpenwitring us to choose among altbe accountts ofthe
part which are consistent with the present state of the earth, And in any quest for a
nomothetic geology it would serve as a source of justification for claims that
some geological hypotheses are to be accorded theoretical status (emphasis
supplied).39

Notice the hermeneutical role played by physics. It guides in choosingamong
several theories that are consistent with the present state of the earth. In other
words, reason and scientific methodology allow geologists to deal with the
evidence in several ways. In order to select from among them, geologists use the
guidance of physical theories. Assumed physical theories, in turn, have been
conceived by bracketing out divine causality from the spatiohistorical continuum
as required by ontological presuppositions. Let us now consider some specific
assumptions from which geologists reconstruct the history of our planet.
Geology Assumes that the Present is
the Key to the Past
In geological studes, we find a rnicro-hermeneuticalexpression of the ontologml
macro-hermeneutical assumption that nature embraces all reality and causes.
Causes in geology "can be understood in large measure through observation of
the world in which we now live."40 If this is so, studying the present allows
scientists to determine what could have taken place in the past, i.e., scientists may
determine the precise shape of the "index" of reality to guide their extrapolations
of present geological events to the past.41In geology, the assumption that the
present becomes our key to the past became e m b d e d in uniformitarianism and
gradualism. Hutton, the father of geology, formulated uniformitarianism as the
assumption standing behind the notion that the present is the key to the past.
Methodological uniformitarianism is the essence of Hutton's gift to history.
Gould notes that it amounts to nothing more, or less, than inductive
reasoning: We make an underlying ontological assumption that physical
processes operating in the material universe remain the same, from the
earliest appearance of particular classes of material furniture, up through the
present momentum, and continuing for as long as such classes offurniturn
continue to exist (emphasis ~riginal)?~

"Theologians should notice that this principle is also at the center o f the analogy principle
on which the historical critical method of Bible interpretation stands; see Ernst Troeltsch, Rckgion
in H i ~ t o v(Minneapolis, M N : Fortress, 1991), 13-14. In geology, this notion was articulated by
Charles Lyell; see Eldredge, 34.
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Another assumption on which geology builds its reconstructionof the past
is the principle of gradualism, according to which "no additional processes not
observable in the present underlie elements of earth and evolutionary history.
Melded with methodologicaluniformitarianism,gradualism accounted for many
of the early triumphs of geology and biology" (emphasis original).43
From the paleontological perspective, Niles Eldredge has perceived the
inconsistency of these principles with the fossil record and has challenged
them;44 yet he continues to apply the results to which paleontology and
evolutionary theory have arrived. Of course, due to the combined effect of the
object they have set themselves to study-the origin of life on our planet-and
the ontological constraints of naturalism, there are not many options avadable
to explore. Besides, since geologsts, paleontologists, and evolutionary
biologists study the past-a nonexistent reality-they can hardly dispense with
the principle of uniformitarianismwhch grounds the analogy between the two
poles within which their methodological extrapolations take place. Without
methodological uniformitarianism, evolutionary theory could not exist.
Adventist scientists, on the other hand, cannot accept the naturalistic
assumption, and are free to explore other possibilities."
Geology Assumes Deep Time
By applying the presuppositions described above, geology arrived at the
conclusion that to properly account for the history of our planet, deep time was
ne~essary.~~
Methodologically speaking, a main foundation on which the
evolutionary theory of the origin of life stands is the notion of deep time, which
grows out of geological studies. The notion of deep time (i.e., long periods of
time measured in billions of years) started as a w o r h g hypothesis that today
is considered a proven fact because of absolute time measurements. Deep time
was first deduced (1820-1870) as a condition of observations of sedimentationerosion to explain geological observation^^^ by deterrnhing "what is older than
what."48Since 1905, technology measuring radioactivity was used to establish
absolute time calculations in contrast with the old comparative method~logy.~~
These methods obviously are not theory- or presupposition-free. They operate

4SNaturalisticontology denies the existence of God or his involvement in our universe and
its history, notions which are necessary hermeneutical conditions of Adventist beliefs. If Adventist
scientists accept naturalistic ontology, then they cease to think as Adventists. They may relate to
the community at a social level but no longer at the level o f its message and mission.
4 6 F ~an
r overview of deep time see Verne Grant, The Evohtionaty Pmcen: A Cdical Rew'ew of
Evolutionary Pmcess (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 275-283.

within the general hermeneutical matrix that supports evolutionary theory.
Deep-time measurement is a complex issue that needs to be investigated
at the theoretical and procedural levels. Adventist thought has room for deep
time due to the existence of the conflict between God and evil before creation
week.50Thus, Scripture allows for deep time in the material components of our
planet but not in the life forms existing on it.
Paleontology Assumes Geology
Once deep time was established, geology generated a general chronology of
events." Whde studying sedimentary strata geologists found fossils, which are
studied by paleontologists.Unlike geology,paleontologycannot have direct, but
only indirect, access to past biological events through the fossil record. In so
doing, paleontologists assume the chronology and geologc column constructed
by geologists. For Hutton and Darwin, the history of earth was written in the
rocks of its
The sequence of fossils in general is invariably repeated.
Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis made it possible to understand the fossil
record and the deep-time chronology set out by geology.53
Evolutionary Biology Assumes
Evolutionary Paleontology
The study of evolution assumes the history of evolution reconstructed by
paleontologsts by drawing inferences from the fossil record, whose chronology
So biological evolution assumes
is drawn by assuming biological ev~lution.~'
paleontology, and paleontology assumes geology and biological evolution.
This brief sample of macro- and micro-herrneneuticalpresuppositions and
the interdisciplinary effort necessary to support biological evolution suggests
the theoretical complexity on which evolutionary theory stands.

As we explained earlier, method is basically an action. What is the rational
"action" scientists perform when building the theory of evolution?The major
?See Richard M. Davidson, "The Biblical Account of Origins," JATS 14/1 (2003): 4-43; and
Randall W. Younker, "Understanding Genesis 1 and 2: A Look at Some Current Issues,"
unpublished paper delivered at the International Faith and Science Conference sponsored by the
General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists (Ogden, UT: General Conference of Seventh-day
Adventists, August 25,2002).

54"The study of evolution is fundamentally a study of history. The patterns of diversity that
ultimately motivate most of us to study evolution cannot be understood without reference to this
history, whether it beglunpsed through paleontology or phylogenetic analysis; and the evolutionary
mechanisms that act on any population do so within bounds set by the population's history"
(Futuyma, 123).
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methodologcal procedure involved in the construction of evolutionaryhistory
is empirical inference.55Geologists infer from the
paleontologists infer
from the fossil record interpreted from the background of geological time and
chronology,5' biologists infer from their observation of present biological
processes.58The present is not only the key to the past, but the springboard
from which the past is reconstructed by literally imagining large events not
present to the scientist^.^^ Thus, the rational procedure through whch the
evolutionary metanarrative is constructed is inference.
What do scientists do when they infer the past from the present? What is an
inference? The dictionary tells us that to infer is the act of passing from one
statement to another or of deriving conclusions from facts or premises. But how
do scientists derive their conclusions from their present facts to reconstruct the
absent past? They do not draw wild conclusions such as guessing in the dark, as,
for instance, we do when brainstorming. What makes an inference scientific is
that it takes place w i t h an assumed theoretical context or "scenario" within
whch it "makes sense" and gains its "ratianahty."60 Scientific inference, then,
5SEmpiricalinference differs from logical inference in that empirical inference starts from a
spatiotemporal experience while logical inference starts with the meaning of statements.
56c'Geologyis the paradigm historical science. Its goal has been the discovery of events and
relationships among events that, being beyond the range of observation, can only be reached in
historical inferences, albeit inferences subject to the prior external constraint of physical theory"
(Kitts, 138). Moreover, "the significant principles of physical theories can be directly instantiated
by the objects with which geologists begin their inferences and, consequently, more or less directly
by the antecedent events meant to explain them" (ibid., 139). The first part of Kitts's statement is
true, but to say that physical principles may be directly instantiated by the historical reconstruction
of causes (theory of the earth) is not correct. Instantiation takes place through experiment or direct
observation, which is impossible in the case of historical events.
57crSecondaryhistorical events are, on the other hand, uniquely historical. They have no
counterpart in the present. They are composed of primary events related in a spatial and temporal
nexus. Some of the temporal relationships among the primary events composing a secondary event
are secured by causal generalization linking events of certain kinds, but others are related by
noncausal ordering principles [chronological dating from geology and paleontology]" (ibid., 137).
"K~tts,137, calls the events that result from this kind of inference "primary historical events,"
which are based on researching present events available within the life span of the observer (136137). "The question ofwhether or not such an event could occur or has occurred can, in principle,
be settled by observation and experiment. Historical events of this kind differ from events we
encounter in the present only by virtue of having occurred in the past. They are reached in primary
historical inferences" (ibid., 137).
'"'The properties which biology identifies as theoretically significant, such as genetic
variability, community structure and energy requirements are simply not to be instantiated in fossils
nor are they in any direct and straightforward way to be inferredfin fossils. There is no mystery
about this contrast between geology and paleontology. It is the result of the obvious fact that the
living bodies and the remains of living bodies, which are the subject matter of biology, do not keep
very well" (ibid., 139-140, emphasis original).
60rc
In the primary historical inference it is supposed that certain states and events in the
present are to be explained by linking them with certain states and events in the past. Because
events do not point intrinsically beyond themselves to other events, causal connections between
past and present must be justified by reference to universal laws or, more commonly, to less
comprehensive and formal generalizations. A generalization plainly cannot be tested by the

requires the henneneutical condition of method for its very existence; and, thus,
scientificinferences cannot be tested. If we could test them, they would no longer
be inferences but experiments or observations. When private investigators and
lawyers attempt to reconstruct a crime, they use inferences from the "evidence"
of the crime that remains in the present. Inferences require evidence (data) and
an assumed scenario (herrneneutical condition^).^' Circumstantial evidenceis weak
because it does not spring directly from the act one is tryulg to reconstruct.Juries
find it difficult to arrive at unanimous verdicts on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. That is to say, evidence and scenario allow for various contradictory
interpretations of the same act. Somethmg similar takes place when scientists
attempt to reconstruct the geological and biological histories of our planet.cWe
have no direct evidenceof macroevolution.Therefore, geological,paleontological,
and biological data can construct only a n'mmstantialcase in favor of evolution
that depends more on the a priori scenario than on the evidence!'
The absence of evidence corroborating macroevolution is a difficult
problem facing evolutionists.To be persuasive,inference must not depart from
the premise or fact from which a prediction or projection is made. In other
words, the nature and extension of the conclusion cannot exceed or
substantially differ from the inferential basis. So, how can a macroevolutionary
history be developed from a nonrnacroevolutionary basis? Eldredge suggests
that evolutionism e~tra~olates.~'
It is not exactly clear what Eldredge means by
"extrapolation" and in what way it differs from inference. If we understand
"extrapolation" as the act through which we "project, extend, or expand
(known data or experience) into an area not known or experienced so as to
arrive at a usually conjectural knowledge of the unknown area,"64 then the
problem is solved, but the price may be higher than evolutionists are willing to
pay. That is to say, if macroevolution is built by extrapolation from evidence,
then evolutionary theory is mere conjecture, supposition, and guesswork.
explanatory inference in which it is presupposed, and there is good reason why attempts are seldom
made to test universal laws in any historical context whatever. Physical and biological laws, and
even the less rigorous generalizations which are often directly invoked in historical inferences, are
tested under the most controlled and circumscribed conditions" (ibid., 133).
6"'There are no theory-free events nor any uninterpreted chronicle composed of them" (ibid.,
134). Kitts says this while dealing with the role o f theory in the construction of past natural history.
This is not justifying knowledge, but projecting knowledge to the past by way of inference. What
paleontologists do here is to build a history justifying it with generalizations from other sciences
and from generalizations created from the study of the fossil record itself.
"'Writing history consists of identifylng from among all the possible worlds permitted by
some presupposed theory, the actual world. This involves describing the actual world in terms of
the initial and boundary conditions which some theory identifies as relevant" (ibid., 135).
63''So a connection had to be forged between uniformitarianism, gradualism, and
reductionism: extriohtionism, the projection of commonly observed rates and processes as a
prediction of what history ought to look like" (Eldredge, 40).
64SeeMemiam- WebsterColhgktcDictionary,10th ed. (Springfield,MA: Merriam-Webster, 1993,
S.V."extrapolation."
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Corroboration
By hearing the news, watching scientific documentaries on TV, and listening to
scientists speak, one gets the impression that evolution is a fact.65By reading what
evolutionary epistemologists say about the epistemological status of evolution,
is crystal clear and there are still
one gets the impression that, while not every*
some rough edges to polish in evolutionary theorizing,66evolution is a fact as
certain as the fact that I am writing this article. For them, doubting evolution
seems unthinkable. One assumes that conclusive proof of evolution exists.
Otherwise, scientists and the general public would not be so sure about it.
The brief epistemological analysis of the scientific method in empirical and
evolutionary sciences has shown they do not produce absolute certainties, but
only working possibilities in search of understanding. Moreover, we have
discovered that due to the hstorical nature of the object it attempts to
understand, evolutionary science has difficulties of its own that place its
outcomes at a lower level than the outcomes of the ahistorical sciences, which
study present repetitive natural phenomena. On the other hand, we have
learned that scientists build theories to tear them down. Yet, that critical spirit
mysteriously disappears when scientists speak about evolution and the history
of the universe. Suddenly, absolute certainty appears out of nowhere. Is
corroboration of evolution so strong that it is able to secure such a high level
of rational certainty? How do we explain the absolute certainty scientists have
about the "fact" that life on our planet evolved from nonexistence to the
astonishing variety and complexity that exist today? It seems to me that
evolutionary certainty is not empirical, but rational.
In the fvst article of this series, we learned that scientific theories cannot
be corroborated directly, but only indirectly.67By deducing some empirical
consequences from a theory, scientists place them under experiment to see if
it reveals what the theory affirms. This testing obviously requires that the
empirical consequences of the theory become cfirectly available, in the present,
to the researcher. But in the case of evolutionism this can only be done partially
because past events which the theory is all about cannot be placed under testing
or experiment.
Evolutionary biologists have tried to test the basic evolutionary notion,
according to which higher forms of life appear from lower forms. The process
of life, as biologists well know, is highly complex and sophsticated.
Spe~iation,6~
i.e., the appearance of new sexually reproducing organisms,
requires "from several hvindred to several thousand years to complete. To an
65''Paleontologistsseem to have expected something even more distinctly nomothetic to
emerge from their own historical studies. Beginning with the claim that they had proved that
evolution had occurred, they have turned to the past with the confidence that it would yield
theoretical illumination as well as historical chronicle" (K~tts,139); see also Futuyma, 102.
"Futuyma, 108-119;Laudan, 58-59.

68Foran introduction to the process of speciation, see Grant, 191-272.

experimental biologist, the process is hopelessly slow. After all, no utterly
convincing case of true speciation (that is, involving sexually reproducing
organisms) has as yet emanated from a genetics lab."69It seems, then, that there
is no test as yet corroborating the mechanism of macroevo1ution.70In other
words, the certainty about evolution does not stand on empirical test,
experiment or observation. It stands in its "rationality" or explanatoryp ~ w e r . ~ '
What is the "rationahty" or explanatory power of the evolutionary theory?
Bunge summarizeswhat evolutionary theory does by remarking that the fact that
most scientific hypotheses are stated in a categorical mode should not
mislead us. When the biologist states that life emerged 2 billon years ago, that
the first terrestrial organisms were lichens, that plants synthesize
carbohydrates out of carbon dioxide and water, that oxygen is indispensable
for animal life, or that all mammals are homeothermal, he is not convging
infomation about experience but is stating hypotheses by means of which certain
chunks ofexperience can k interpreted his assumptions, being hypotheses,are not
about experience but about nonexperientiablefacts, and he will employ them
in order to explain his biological experience (emphasis supplied).72

The "powery'by which evolution grips scientists and societyrests on its coherent
account of a considerable amount of what scientists consider "hrm"knowledge,
acquired by many sciences through a long period of time, by way of a single
metanarrative e~~lanation.'~
So, the more evolution matches the index of reality7j
of our culture, the less scientists and the general public may consider

70Microevolution,i.e., changes within a species, has been discovered and tested by biologists.
711nhis apology of evolution against creationism, Abusing Science: The Case agaittst Creationim,
evolutionist epistemologist Philip Kitcher makes considerable effort to counteract the creationist
claim that evolution is not a science because it cannot be falsified (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
19823, 30-49). My point here is not that evolutionism is not a science-it obviously is-but that
the certainty of its results is not rationally compulsive even by scientific standards. When it comes
to scientific criteria, however, even scientists do not agree, and each one applies what works in his
or her field and specific research project. Kitcher explicitly recognizes that evolutionary theory has
not been corroborated by stating that "if one accepts the idea that science requires proof, or if one
adopts the naive falsificationistcriterion, then the theory of evolution-and every other scientific
theory-will turn out not to be a part of science" (ibid., 49).
72MarioBunge, Scienttfic Research I: The Searchfor Syslem (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1967), 225.
73c'What,in the end, drives evolution? As the answers to these and many other questions
unfold, we begin to converge on a coherent theory that links the evolution of life with the physical
history of the pIanet-not as a long series of isolated events, but in regular, repeated, law like
patterns that can be generalized into a coherent theory of physical and organic evolutionary
process. Along the way, we also see how process is inferred from pattern-the fundamental
ingredient of genuine scientific discovery" (Eldredge, 7).
74"Narrativesderive their authority from two different sources: from the text and from the
author. The authority of the text is simply a function of the index of reality that it manifests. The
higher the index, the more authority we grant it. But text with a low index might yet be given
greater authority because of the author" wchards, 30); "Darwin's implicit strategy, though, was
to blur the distinction between narratives of an imaginative character that expressly made the case
he wanted to advance but having a low index of reality, with those of higher index" (ibid., 26).
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corroboration or testing necessary to accept it.75It just makes too much sense to
be wr0ng.7~The corroboration, then, is rational because the theory stands on its
inner consistency and outer coherence within the general "web" of "firm"
knowledge accepted by Western culture?' In the corroboration of
macroevolutionary theory, the "web of belief' replaces empirical testability.
But the rationality or inner consistency of evolutionary theory, with data
such as the fossil record, is still in the making.78One could have assumed that
if inconsistencies arise then the theory could be falsified. When inconsistencies
arise in evolutionary theory, however, scientists do not abandon the theory, but
patch it up by producing other hypotheses and theories that might smooth
them out. This being the case, we need to ask whether evolutionary theory is
falsifiable. According to Popper,
a system must b e described UJ coqbiex ofthe highest degree if, in accordance with
conventionalist practice, o n e holds fast t o it a s a system established forever
which o n e is determined t o rescue, whenever it is in danger, by the
introduction o f auxiliary hypotheses. F o r the degree o f falsifiability o f a
system thus protected is equal t o xero (emphasis

It seems, then, that the inner consistency and explanatory power of a
theory justify it. The higher its power, the less likely it is to be rejected by the
scientific community and the general public. The explanatory power of
evolutionary theory accounts for its hold on contemporary scientists and
society. Even though all theories are revisable, not all theories are equal, argues
Kitcher. "Even though our present evidence does not prove that evolutionary
biology--or quantum physics, or plate tectonics, or any other theory-is
true-evolutionary
biologists will maintain that the present evidence is
overwhelmingly in favor of their theory and overwhelmgly against its
75Forinstance, commenting on Gould's proposal for fine-tuning evolutionary theory, IGtts,
143, affirms that "there is a significant way in which macro-evolutionary theories must be
dependent. Paleontology can provide knowledge not only of events, but of patterns and trends
among events. It cannot provide justification for the claim that any of its generalizations have
explanatory efficacy; that they are, among other things, projected. The justification must come, as
it does in geology, from showing that the generalizations are comprehended by theories which, by
common consent, have such efficacy."
76"The higher the index of reality, the more the readers are invited to step beyond the
particular history text to test the adequacy of its claims. Though, paradoxically,the higher the index
the more the text suggests that readers need not accept the invitation, for a high index also brings
greater authority and confidence in the truths of the narrative" Wchards, 25).
"Kitcher, 48-49, 130, attempts to salvage the scientific status of evolution by calling on its
power of explanation and its comprehensive theoretical reach and complexity; for a summary of
the explanatory power of evolution, see Tim Berra, Evohtion and the Myth o/Creationism: A Aakc
Guide to the Fads in the Evolutjon Debate (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 52-69.
7BConsider,for instance, that "although each side in the notorious dispute between those who
subscribe to punctuated equilibrium and those who subscribe to gradualism points to paleontology
in support of their position, there are enormous contingent barriers which stand in the way of
resolving the issue on evidence provided by the fossil record" (Kitts, 142).
79KarlR. Popper, The Logic ofScient$c Discovey, rev. ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1959), 145.

supposed rivals."80 We should not understand Kitcher's phrase "present
evidence" as a reference to experimentation or observation,but to the general
status of our not-so-fum, scientific,theoretical, revisable knowledge. Moreover,
the explanatory power and rationality of evolution do not corroborate it or
make it true; they only make it persuasive.
It is obvious that creationism hnds the same lirmtations about
corroboration and falsifiability. Will we reach a point in which the controversy
about the understanding of origins will be solved?

Believing the Myfb @f~tanawative)
That evolution's hold on the scientific community stems from its explanatory
power is only part of the equation. We need to consider also that the issues
evolution explains are necessary for our human experience. In other words, we
need to have an answer to the cosmogony question in order to understand our
world and our own beings. This has always been so. Religion and philosophy deal
with cosmogonies and cosmologies,and the output that comes from religious and
philosophical discussion is referred to as worldviews." Our understanding of the
origination of the world and its nature are part of the macro-herrneneutical
assumptions that guide our understanding of human affairs, the operation of
human reason:* and even the construction of Christian theology.
Since both evolution and creation are commensurable, underdetermined
theories attempting to explain the history of our planet:) we should not use
them as presuppositions when considering other issues-theoretical or
practical. We should not use them because we have no certainty about their
truthfulness. Yet, we are forced to choose and in practice accept one of the
competing theories as absolutely true. This acceptance is not based on reason
or method, but on faith, i.e., on the relative confidence we personally place on
the theory we adopt as being the most persuasive explanation of reality.
Epistemologically speaking, then, the basic difference between creation and
evolution is not rational, but methodologcal. Methodologically, creation and
evolution differ in the source producing the metanarrative about the origins of the
"Kitcher, 34.
"For a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of the notion of worldview, see David K.
Naugle, WorHuiew: The Hishy $a Concept (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
82See,for instance, how the acceptance of evolution makes an evolutionary approach to
epistemology possible in Gerard Radnitzky and W. W. Bartley 111, eds., Evohtionaty Episfemohgv,
Rationu&, and the .focio/bgyofKnowhdge (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987).
""But it is only on the basis of an agreed-upon external constraint that we can engage in
rational debate about what the fossil record tells us. Of course, there may be perfectly legitimate
disagreements about the character and extent of the restriction to be applied, but they are prior to
an assessment of the fossil record. The dispute between evolutionists and biblical creationists is
only the most incoherent of ail of those about the meaning of the fossil record that have arisen
outside the boundaries of an agreed-upon external constraintJ' (K~tts,140-141). The incoherence
of the debate comes from the macro-hermeneuticalpresuppositions and the index of reality derived
from them that each party brings to the table. In short, they approach the issue with different
rational and methodologxal a priories.
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universe. Evolution's source is natural, our interpretation from the scattered traces
of the past. Creation springs from divine revelation, God's summary account of
his handiwork." Both work on tacit metaphysical and theoretical macro- and
meso-presuppositions. Both attempt to understand the same subject matter or
reality. Both use rational procedures in reading the scattered traces fiom the past.
The difference boils down to a different "index of reality." Creationists have a
broader index of reality than evolutionists. The former includes God and his
revelation, while the latter excludes them. No wonder the interpretations are
different. This divergence about the index of reality becomes the leading macroherrneneutical difference between the two conflicting metanarratives.
When evolutionism becomes a presupposition to explain other areas of
reality, it ceases to be a scientific theory and becomes a metaphysical or religious
belief we accept by a leap of faith. To criticize theories becomes increasingly
difficult when we use them as presuppositions to interpret other fields of reality
because we have made them the foundation of our entire intellectual position.
Mhen we use them in this way, they become absolute truth for us. Of course,
when we speak of faith, theologians are on their own turf, while scientists have
left theirs behmd. The sooner scientists and theologians understand the macrohermeneutical role of cosmology, and that faith, not reason, is required for its
application, the sooner the far-reaching consequences of the creation-evolution
debate will be understood. Creation and evolution are not only competingin the
scientific attempt to interpret the history of our planet, but as they elicit our
assent, they become metanarratives we accept by faith and use to build our
understandmg of the world and of Christian theology. Each alternativegenerates
conflictmg views of the entire world of human experience.
Creation and evolution are metanarratives in conflict. In classical times we
would have seen them as conflicting metaphysical teachings. Neither is
irrational, because each makes sense of the same broad chunks of reality. Each
has been produced by appropriate methodological procedures accepted in its
own field of research. Only by making the scientifica priori absolute can we say
that creation and the metanarrative it elicits are not scientific.But the scientific
absolute stands only on the consensus of the scientific community, not on the
absolute dictates of reason or scientific methodology. The truth is that each is
an equally persuasive account of reality as a whole. The conflict between them,
then, d l never be solved rationally, only e s c h a t ~ l o ~ i c a l l ~ . ~ ~

The power and reliability of science stands on its method. From our brief
analysis of scientific methodology in general part I), we have discovered that
T h i s makes biblical creation substantially different from Plato's account of creation. The
former claims to originate in God, the latter in Plato's scientific explanation.
"It seems to me this issue will be eschatologically decided. If the God o f Scripture is God
he will manifest himself in space and time at the end of human history to fulfill his promises and
renew our planet with the creative power by which he brought it into existence. At that time the
creation theory will be corroborated and verified.

scientific method reaches its highest level of reliability and predictability when
it is applied to the present, repetitive phenomena of nature. Yet even at its
hghest level of certainty scientific methodology is always an interpretation
dependent on hermeneutical a priories that prevent it from dmovering absolute
inerrant truth from empirically generated data. Scientific methodology applied
to recurrent natural processes produces tentative explanations of reality, which
should not be accepted dogmatically, but be critically examined, modified,
rejected, and rePlacedmg6
From the concise analysis of the way in whch scientificmethodology is used
to build evolutionary theory the epistemological h t a t i o n s become more
prominent. Among others, a & lunitation springs from the absence of the
object of study, which, being past, stands beyond observation and
experimentation. The historicity of its object forces scientists to rely heady on
inferences from what is accessible to them in the present (fossils, rocks, live
organisms). From these empirically accessible sources of data scientists
reconstruct the natural history of our planet in the form of a secular
metanarrative. Such reconstructionhas a very low level of rational certainty based
on empirical evidence. For secular society, however, scientists play the role of
prophets, and evolutionary metanarrative is received as cultural dogma imbued
with a degree of certainty alien to scientific methodology. Evolution becomes a
myth, scientific theory a fact. When evolution becomes dogma, faith replaces
reason and science turns into religon.
We are now in a position to answer the question proposed at the beginning
of this article: Is the epistemological certainty of evolutionary theory so absolute
that Chnstian theologians should feel rationally compelled to accept its
conclusions even if they explicitly contradxt the teachings of biblical revelation
on the origin of life on our planet?87The answer is clear: Scientific methodology
and rationahty do not reach a degree of certainty that compels Chnstian
theologians to accept evolutionary theory as a fact to whch biblical teachmgs
should be ac~ornrnodated?~
The rationahty of scientific methodology has the
power to claim evolutionary theory as a possible explanation of the highly
complex question of o r i p s . Yet, it clearly falls short of malung its explanation
absolutely certain, thereby necessitating the assent of all rational beings. Why,
then, should Christian and Adventist theologians feel compelled to accommodate
Scripture to the parameters dictated by the evolutionary metanarrative?
Canale, 98-99.
"In this article, we are considering the science-theology relation only in regard to the
cosmolo~calquestions of origins. However, the answer given to this relation extends to all issues
on which science and Scripture have parallel pronouncements.
"Fritz Guy represents a sector of Adventist theologians and scientists convinced that
evolution is a fact and that we should interpret Scripture and Christian doctrine accordingly
(Ynterpreting Genesis One in the Twenty-first Century," Specfnrm 31, no. 2 [2003]: 5-16).

